Abstract Abstract Abstract Abstract: : : : Facing hackers' intelligent attacks and multi-source information from various security equipments, evaluating real-time risk of the network becomes more and more complicated to handle. This paper proposes a new attack graphs model(NAG)-based analysis method in order to assess the impact on the network system made by multiple vulnerabilities. Aiming at simplify the attack graphs, we combined attack graphs with Bayesian theory and put forward an optimized algorithm to remove the cycles in attack graphs. By importing Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) and attack evidence, the assessment method in this paper can dynamically evaluate the partial or entire network security. Experimental results show that the method can reflect the changing situation of the network security.
Introduction Introduction Introduction Introduction
In face of sophisticated and multi-step network attacks, vulnerabilities bring a lot risk to the network systems. Though the scanners such as Nessus [1] can find individual vulnerabilities, the attackers usually combine multiple vulnerabilities to penetrate networks with devastating impact [2] which we should take into account when evaluating the security of the network. As a model of risk assessment, attack graphs can find out all possible actions of an attacker who may use the relationship of the vulnerabilities and then analysis the threats the network faced.
There exists many approaches for evaluating network security based on attack graphs. Marcel et al. [3] propose a Dynamic Bayesian Networks-based model which provides a theoretical foundation and a practical framework for continuously measuring network security. But as time goes on, there will be an enormous space to maintain which goes aginst to realtime assessment. Nayot et al. [4] combined Bayesian theory and attack graphs in risk assessment, however they ignored the cycles that exist in attack graphs. Yun Ye et al. [5] evaluated network security based on probability of nodes in attack graphs but they didn't give a measure of evaluating the impact on network system brought by attacks. Xi Zhang et al. [6] computed the risk score using the CVSS [7] in attack graphs, however they didn't concern the dynamic changing of the network.
In this paper, by combining Bayesian theory, we proposed a new attack graphs model (NAG) based on which we designed an effective assessment method by importing CVSS and attack evidence. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. We firstly define the new model of attack graphs, secondly give the method of risk assessment based on attack graphs, then present experimental evaluation and in the end conclude the paper.
Attack Attack Attack Attack Graphs Graphs Graphs Graphs model model model model
The new attack graphs model is a structure of using five elements group to describe information. Its structure: NAG=< S, A, E, P >.
Among the model: S is the set of attributes; A is the set of atomic attacks and also the edges in NAG; E is the set of relationships; P is the set of probabilities. And the model should abide the followings:
(1 (4). ∀Si∈Sin∪Sf, ∃ei∈E correspond to Si and ei∈{AND, OR, MIX}. In traditional attack graphs, the parents of atomic attacks has the relationship of AND. Similarly, the parents of attributes has the relationship of OR. Since this paper combined the edges with the atomic attacks, there are three relationships in NAG: AND, OR, MIX, as shown in Fig. 1 and the relationship is denoted by the set of E.
S1
S2 One difficulty in combining Bayesian theory and attack graphs lies in the cycles in attack graphs which deeply affect the probability computing of the nodes. There are mainly two types of cycles. As shown in Fig. 2(a) , the ovals stand for attribute nodes and rectangles stand for atomic attack nodes. In the attack path a4→S7→a5→S8→a4, the execution of a4 requires both S5 and S8 to be satisfied. However, S8 can be only satisfied by the execution of a5, which requires a4 to be executed first. So this type of cycles cannot exist in the real network. The other type of cycles is like the attack path S6→a7→S9→a8→S6 which may be found in network, however, based on the study of paper [8] , attackers won't lose its ability, so they won't try to obtain the attributes they already got.
In order to remove the two types of cycles, this paper proposed an algorithm to optimize attack graphs. The algorithm was shown as follows:
Input: A-set of atomic attack nodes in original attack graph S-set of attribute nodes in original attack graph Output：A'-set of atomic attack nodes in optimized attack graph S'-set of attribute nodes in optimized attack graph Algorithm: The converting from traditional attack graphs to NAG in Fig.2 shows that the nodes in NAG are apparently fewer than that in the traditional one which helps to analysis network security easier.
Risk Risk Risk Risk assessment assessment assessment assessment using using using using N N N NAG AG AG AG In NAG, ∀Si∈So，Si is the initial attribute which attackers possess and currently P(Si)=1; ∀Si∈ Sin∪Sf, according to Bayesian Theory：
The probability of the attribute nodes associates with its parents and the atomic attacks which come from its parents to it. Considering the relationship of its parents, we define P(Si) as Eq. 2.
P S P S P S S e OR P S P Pa S S e MIX
When evaluating the network security, its complicated and dynamic characteristics cannot be ignored. The probability can change due to some attack incidents which may be observed by the network security equipments. Thus, this paper introduces the concept of attack evidence(AE) that express the attackers' exploring incidents or the attributes which the attackers already got. Assume that AE={S1 ' ， S2 ' …Sn ' }, ∀Si ' ∈AE, Si'=1；∀Si∈S-AE, the Bayesian posterior probability equation can be used to update the probability:
Based on the factors of network risk assessment: asset, vulnerability and threat, this paper defines the risk as: Risk = f (V, M, P). V denotes the value of the asset; M denotes the influence brought by vulnerabilities; P denotes the property of the threat's exploring.
The value of the assets should be educed by the level of confidentiality, integrity and availability. This paper proposed five levels: very low, low, medium, high, very high that was replaced by 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5. The level of confidentiality, integrity and availability was confirmed by experts.
For the complexity and diversity of the vulnerabilities and threats, we use the CVSS to define the two factors. The CVSS is an open vulnerability scoring framework which was put forward by the NIAC. The CVSS is composed of three metric groups: Base, Temporal, and Environmental, each consisting of a set of metrics [9] . In this paper the Temporal and Environmental group are ignored for we are interested in defining and communicating the fundamental characteristics of vulnerability which is the purpose of the Base group. The Base group contains six metrics: access vector (AV), access complexity (AC), authentication (AU), confidentiality impact (CI), integrity impact (II) and availability impact (AI). Their scoring standard is listed in Table 1 . As shown in Table 1 , the Access Vector, Access Complexity, and Authentication metrics capture how the vulnerability is accessed and whether or not extra conditions are required to exploit it. In this study, we use the three metrics to define P(a) in NAG:
P(a) only reflects the probability of the atomic attack itself, however in NAG the atomic attack also rely on the attribute nodes' probability(P(S)). Considering the relationship of AND, the success probability of atomic attack was defined as P'(a)：
The three impact metrics of confidentiality impact, integrity impact and availability impact measure how a vulnerability will directly affect the asset if exploited. This paper combined the three metrics with the score of assets to define the function (In(a) ) that denotes the impact brought by atomic attack:
C、I、A are the score of assets' confidentiality, integrity and availability that will be defined by experts. α、β、γ are the weights of confidentiality, integrity and availability, and α+β+γ=3。
The risk score of the atomic attack is defined as Eq. 7:
In order to evaluate the entire network security, the risk score of the network is expressed as the sum of all the atomic attacks' risk scores in NAG:
Case Case Case Case study study study study
An experiment was done to test the assessment method proposed in this paper. The experimental circumstance is shown in Fig. 3 . The topology in the experiment is composed of attack and target network. Machine A is a Web server; Machine B is an database server that offers ftp and rsh services; Machine C is a file server that offers ftp, ssh, and rsh services. The available services are presented by Table 2 which is controlled by the firewall. Table 2 available services  traffic direction  available ports  available services  0�1  80  web  2�1  80  web  1�2 21, 22, 514 ftp, rsh, ssh
In the experiment, we first collected the vulnerability in the experiment network which can be obtained by using the scanner software Nessus, then marked them with CVE [10] number through which the CVSS scores can be checked. The experts scored the value of victim services by confidentiality, integrity and availability , and in this experiment we assumed that α=1.1、β=1.0、 γ=0.9. Then P(a) and In(a) can be computed by Eq. 4 and 6. The summary of vulnerability is presented as Table 3 . Based on the topology, the firewall's security device and vulnerabilities of the network, the NAG of the experiment was drawn in Fig. 4 .
Based on the relationships of vulnerabilities shown in NAG, we can get P(Si) and P'(a) without attack evidence by Eq. 1、2 and 5. Then the attack network started to exploit the target network, and later the target network got some attack evidence which was shown in Table 4 . 
The probability of the attribute nodes in NAG then can be updated by Eq. 3 and 5 with attack evidence and then the risk score can be computed in NAG. The assessment results were shown in Table 5 . As a web server, machine A's 80 port can be visited by attack and target network. Its asset is not very valuable, so when the evidence shows that the attackers get the root, the risk score doesn't rise quickly. As machine B and C were not open to attack network, when finding the evidence that they got attacked, it shows that the attackers use the relationships of the vulnerabilities in NAG. For the high value of their assets, the risk scores highly rise.
Experimental results which are consisted in the theory of the assessment method show that it not only can evaluate the threat of the network but also dynamically reflect the changing of security situation.
Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion Conclusion
The wide application network technology bring about more and more destructive attacks. To better protect the network, defense method faces the transition from passive defense to active defense. As an important part of the active defense system, real-time risk assessment can analysis the tendency of the network security situation which benefits early warning and strategy implementation. However, previous researches paid more attention to static risk measures which cannot satisfy the requirement of active defense system.
In this paper, a new type of attack graphs model was proposed by combing Bayesian theory, based on which we put forward a risk assessment method by importing CVSS and attack evidence. Through a case in testing network, we proved that unlike previous approaches on attack graphs, the method can dynamically reflect the network security situation which helps to provide active defense with decision-making information. In future work, we focus on the research of finding minimum-cost network hardening measure.
